The Iraq Study Group Report II
I mentioned previously that I downloaded the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report and was actually going to read it and arrive at an opinion on it, rather than rely on the already escalating noise about it from network news, and the online bloviatosphere.1. This is going to be a tad long, so break out the Sterno.
Introduction
The very short answer is that the report is about 50 pages too long and lacks too much substantive content that anyone that has read more than ten words on realist theory (whether of the neo-, structuralist, rationalist or classicist schools) would find revelatory.2. It repeats itself too often, and is not always as explanatory in some recommendation areas, while providing more concrete material in others. It’s a quick read, but not always the most riveting, even when discussing some options that even under the current political environment, are most likely seen as difficult sells. This could be seen as a reaction to the often detached or almost cold decisional calculus that realism espouses. To that,
Political realists are often characterised as a-moralists, that any means should be used to uphold the national interest, but a poignant criticism is that the definition of morality is being twisted to assume that acting in one’s own or one’s nation’s interests is immoral or amoral at best.
I state this because the report is already being hammered on the left and right for positions that do not easily fit into either, which makes partisanship more difficult; this of course, is something I find a useful byproduct. No plan going forward has a sliver of succeeding -regardless of how much the ISG Report is used in the formulation of it- without a broad base of support at the legislative level to enact the measures needed to make a plan move and to provide oversight. Congress and the Executive need to ask what do they wish to accomplish, and how important it is, and then look at what actually may work. Otherwise, you must not actually want it, because no one looks at a nail and says “I know this Black & Decker hammer will punch the nail into the place I want, but I want to use a Nerf Hammer, and that is all I am willing to use.” Well, then your hammering plan will fail unless you change your tool or change your goal.
I do applaud most of the composition of the study group itself. While I will not name who I think was really not deserving or of only basic acceptability, I will praise those I think stand out as good choices: Co-Chairs James Baker III and Lee Hamilton, as well as Lawrence Eagleburger and Sandra Day O’Conner. Of the academics/think tank names that stood out, Michael O’Hanlon, Larry Diamond, Kenneth Pollack, Keith Crane, David L. Mack, Reuel Marc Gerecht, James F. Dobbins and William Quandt are many of the familiar names that come up, and aspects of their positions and analytical approaches do appear to have been woven into the report. I am going to be more trusting of members of places like RAND and Brookings than of partisan players from the current administration and Congressional heavy hitters from either party. And while I bear no grievance against George Will (whose capacity to not give in to the infantilization and general retardation of written discourse I admire), I do not understand why he was consulted.
I will break this down along the same lines as the report itself, since there is a lot to cover. In the opening Letter From the Co-Chairs, they get off and running right away:
There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq….Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq.
I believe now is where many people make alliterations to a fecal matter and a detective named Holmes. The lack of substantive debate has been bad for quite some time, and changes in level of vapidity from year to year, but the past few years have been marked by an abyssmally bad polarization of public discourse by our elected officials, with a concurrent ignoring of people in academic and governmental circles that have practical experience and in-depth knowledge (but lack partisan teeth).3. The result is policy formation that has been insulted from most substantive critique or adjustment, and results that are spun furiously until they careen out of control. And while the report states plainly, “Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate within a democracy.” one has to wonder how they intend to do this. Even if you were to immediately get the elected to debate with comity and a sense of unified purpose (as opposed to partisanship in every utterance), you have a general population that is almost hostile to intellectual discourse of any kind, and in general lack the tools to properly juggle all the elements in play. I do not simply mean academic or elitist intellectualism, but a solid grasp of what is in play, and what policy options are available. We spend so much time parsing sematics, that we redefine and recontextualize politics into the realms of soap-opera escapism. Even the report states explicitly,
All of our efforts…are handicapped by Americans’ lack of language and cultural understanding.
And while that quote was specifically directed at the personnel we have in Iraq, I think it applies far more broadly. Time and again, I encounter people in online fora and in the real world who cannot discern between Arabs, Kurds, Persians, Azeri and Turks, or that the region is not just Muslim, but various sects of Christianity exist (derived from both the Latin and Byzantine Catholic rites), as well as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Baha’i. Even with Islam, they might understand that there are Sunni and Shia, but not what the dynamics between the two are, or that there are other sects such as Druze and Sufi in play.4. These facts, while most likely of at least some relevance to figuring out what is best steps, even at the elected level, we see less than informed debate far too often. This is exacerbated by the prominence of pop-pundits with little at stake save their book deals and appearances on TV infotainment shows, largely generating the superfluous and inflammatory jibberish of simpletons.
By the time we get into the Executive Summary, we get a very effusive,
If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The global standing of the United States could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized.
Could is a very popular word in that statement, but I think it belabors the point that all of those aspects are. The question is to what degree, and how to avert the trend (which I, like the ISG, believe is still possible). The report itself mentioned that there are severe discrepencies in the reporting consistency of violence, that general living conditions are often well below pre-war levels and at best floating near pre-war levels, and that Al Qaeda has made its presence more prominent, and that neighboring countries have made themselves part of the problem by either passive or active means. Examples include Sunni insurgents privately funded by significant numbers of Saudi citizens, Iran and Syria having porous borders and allowing men and materiel supporting insurgents and militias to pass through essentially uncontested.
As for the polarization, I am of the opinion that we are entering at least a small window of time where bipartisanship may have a bit of a comeback, as divided government tends to engender exactly that. The last mid-term election sealed that in place until at least 2008, and most of the literature and certainly my own anecdotal recollection of the Federal government during my lifetime support that idea. This is important, as even the report states plainly, “U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure -as is any corse of action in Iraq- if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus.” Not a 51% majority (which according to partisans qualified as a mandate), but a solid consensus.5.
More later.
1. My word for the political blogosphere. And to qualify -since technically this blog is just as much a part of the blogosphere- is that firstly, I do not do this to bring partisan screaming to the forefront, as that is the last thing we need more of. Secondly, I am interested in providing a framework for myself to air out the questions I have in my own head; if someone else can use it, great, but otherwise I am not addressing any intended audience with a predisposed political orientation. I have no desire to be a punt return for Green Footballs, your periodic Kos, or any other such position.
2. Some names commonly associated with these schools are Hedley Bull, John Mearsheimer, Robert Jervis, . One decent book with a good cross-section of International Relations (IR) theory is [CITATION]
3. When lives and treasure are at stake, I find such actions far more reprehensible than when it is the less tragic -but equally pathetic- jockeying for pork.
4. Or that within the Islamic world, that such groups have been at times during history at odds with each other much as Catholic and Protestant orders have borne ill-will to each other for various reasons. Many do not even know what the cause of the great schism between Rome and Constantinople (Istambul), and barely have a grasp of the origins of Protestantism or why it is so fractious. And when that is explained, it often can be digested fairly easily. Yet when the various branches of the other Abrahamic traditions are explained (because we seem equally incapable of discerning that there is a difference between Jewish sects as much as Muslim ones), the glazing of the eyes is thick.
5. I never felt the last Presidential election resulted in a mandate of any kind. It was a clear victory for George W. Bush, but was still far too close to merited claims of a mandate. Ronald Reagan versus Walter Mondale and FDR versus Al Smith were spectacular trouncings that resulted in what could be easily seen as mandates from the people. In a more infamous twist, John Ashcroft losing an election to a two week old corpse was a stunning embarrassment. The corpse was given the mandate of finding a living substitute as the first course of action.
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